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Easy Prisoner Cases
Lisa Kerr*

Straightforward legal victories are rare for the prisoner litigant. First,
court orders can be difficult to enforce in the prison context, such that the
formal legal outcome of prisoner litigation is often less important to
effective reform than other factors.1 Second, courts are often deferential
to prison officials in light of the pressures that appear to bear upon the
prison context. Even in cases where the individual prisoner officially
succeeds, courts may announce legal tests designed to accommodate the
preferences of government and prison officials.
Prisoners prevailed in two recent Supreme Court of Canada cases. In
Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, a case about legislative changes
to parole entitlements, the Court protects prisoner expectations by
holding that post-sentencing legislative changes that automatically
extend time in prison are constitutionally invalid.2 In Mission Institution
v. Khela, a case in which a prisoner challenged his involuntary transfer to
a higher-security prison, the Court rejects the government’s persistent
attempts to narrow prisoner access to habeas corpus, thereby preserving
the ability of prisoners to challenge the liberty-depriving decisions of
prison officials. 3 Both cases entailed the largely straightforward
application of clear constitutional principles and settled law, and in both
cases all courts below agreed on the outcome as did a unanimous
Supreme Court. These were, in several respects, easy cases and clear
victories.
The first point to complicate this portrait is to note that these
holdings had limited practical effect. A larger scheme designed to reduce
access to parole in the background of Whaling was not at stake. The
Court held only that the scheme must apply prospectively, and the
*
With thanks to Benjamin L. Berger, Ryan Dalziel, Audrey Macklin, Allan Manson,
Joana Thackery and Mark Walters for sharing comments on this article that improved the whole
substantially.
1
See generally, Jules Lobel, Success without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long
Road to Justice in America (New York: New York University Press, 2003).
2
[2014] S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”].
3
[2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 2014 SCC 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khela”].
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retroactive cases were a relatively small and shrinking group. The three
litigants at bar, for example, had already been released by other means
when final judgment was rendered. The prisoner in Khela was almost
immediately transferred again, for the exact same reason, but this time
through a decision that the prison took better care to justify and insulate
from review.4
Apart from their limited practical effects, each decision contains
worrying lines of thought. At the core of each is a view that the power to
determine significant aspects of the qualitative terms of imprisonment
are largely assigned or delegated to the administrative penal realm.
Relatedly, the vision of judicial review and constitutional rights
contained in these decisions is that of partial and deferential constraints
on the otherwise expansive powers of prison officials to determine the
meaning of state punishment. This may be business as usual in the law
that governs prisons, but we should at least be precise about the limits
and potential consequences of these putative victories.
In the course of the Whaling analysis, the Court confirms a doctrinal
and conceptual divide between the terms of imprisonment that courts
consider to be an official part of the sentence and those that amount to
mere modes of sentence administration. This reasoning reflects the way
that the legal system is currently organized and conceptualized with
respect to imprisonment. In this conventional understanding, the central
term of the sentence — the formal duration or quantity of custodial
time — is announced by the sentencing judge and receives robust legal
review and protection. The conditions of confinement and other concrete
features and experiences of imprisonment are delegated to prison
officials and, while governed by a legislative and policy framework,
attract minimal constitutional coverage and largely deferential modes of
judicial review. In reality, however, as I argue in this article, the duration
and conditions of custody are not so neatly separated, but rather interact
with and bear upon one another throughout the administration of a
custodial term imposed by a court.
Turning to Khela, this is a decision that protects central developments
of modern prison law in two key respects: the Court holds the prison
system to now settled arrangements regarding, first, prisoner access to
courts and, second, the rule of law in prison administration. On the first
point, the bulk of the Khela decision is concerned with resisting the most
recent attempt by government lawyers to narrowly confine the scope of
4

Khela v. Mission Institution (Warden), [2011] B.C.J. No. 836, 2011 BCSC 577 (B.C.S.C.).
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habeas corpus review. Khela confirms that the 1985 Miller trilogy,
unambiguously affirmed in 2005 in May v. Ferndale, remains good law.5
As Khela repeats: the provincial superior courts and the statutory Federal
Court have concurrent jurisdiction to review deprivations of prisoner
liberty, through habeas corpus or judicial review, respectively. Second,
Khela insists that prison officials abide by the plain language of their
governing legislation. Under that heading, the Court found that the prison
failed to disclose information to Khela in accordance with legislative rules
and thereby breached procedural fairness.
A third aspect of the Khela decision raises more difficulty. While not
strictly necessary to dispose of the appeal, the Supreme Court holds, for
the first time, that the standard of review for the substance of official
decisions in habeas corpus is reasonableness. And yet, the fundamental
character of habeas corpus is constitutional: that is the very reason why
provincial superior courts retain concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal
Court, which otherwise has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative
decisions of the Correctional Service of Canada as a federal entity. In
this article I argue that the Khela decision appears as yet another
instance of administrative standards eclipsing constitutional law. 6 The
implications of importing an essentially deferential reasonableness
standard into habeas corpus remain unclear at this stage. As Audrey
Macklin has noted more generally, it is difficult to predict the
consequences of such a “jurisprudential mashup”.7 What does seem clear
is that the Court has shifted away from the historical distinctiveness of
the writ of habeas corpus, endorsing a view that the decisions of prison
employees should attract deference even in cases in which constitutional
rights are engaged.
5
May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“May”], affirming: Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] S.C.J. No. 78, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
643 (S.C.C.); R. v. Miller, [1985] S.C.J. No. 79, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Miller”];
Morin v. Canada (National Special Handling Unit Review Committee), [1985] S.C.J. No. 80, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 662 (S.C.C.) [three cases hereinafter “Miller trilogy”].
6
See generally, Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative
Law: Cross-Fertilization or Inconstancy?” in Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative
Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013), at 407; Mark D. Walters, “Respecting
Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in Canadian Administrative Law”
in Mark Elliott and Hanna Wilberg, eds., The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing
Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), at 395-422 [hereinafter “Walters, ‘Respecting
Deference as Respect’”]; Lorne Sossin and Mark Friedman, “Charter Values and Administrative
Justice”, Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13/2014; Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or
Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the Charter” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger &
S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 563 [hereinafter “Macklin “Charter Right’”].
7
Macklin, “Charter Right”, id., at 563.
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I. THE WHALING “VICTORY”: NO NEW PUNISHMENT
AFTER THE FACT
The story of Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling begins over
20 years before the case was decided. In 1992, Parliament brought in a
policy called accelerated parole review (“APR”) that would allow nonviolent first-time offenders in the federal prison system to access early
release through a simplified procedure, provided they met basic criteria.
The process was automatic: eligible offenders were referred to the
National Parole Board without having to apply.8 Decisions were made by
paper review, and with no hearing.9 The test for release was based on a
presumptive standard, lower than the one applicable to normal parole.
The Board had no discretion to decide against release so long as there
were no reasonable grounds to believe that the offender was likely
to commit an offence involving violence. 10 In 1997, the process was
expanded to include early eligibility for day parole as well as full parole:
eligible offenders would now be considered for day parole after serving
the later of one-sixth of the sentence imposed or six months.11 The idea
behind these policies is clear: remove relatively non-criminalized, often
young individuals from a destructive environment, and begin the process
of supervised reintegration into the community as early as possible.
In March 2011, the Abolition of Early Parole Act (“AEPA”)12 came
into effect, seemingly fuelled by a sense that fraud and white-collar
crime should not be punished differently than crimes of violence.13 In the
Whaling decision, the Court acknowledges the fact of criticism of the APR
scheme, but does not engage in a thorough review of the evidence.14 The
8
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, s. 126(4), repealed
[hereinafter “CCRA”].
9
CCRA, id., at s. 126(1), repealed.
10
Id., s. 126(2), repealed.
11
Id., s. 119.1, repealed.
12
S.C. 2011, c. 11.
13
Remarks from Mr. Paul Calandra (Oak Ridges – Markham, CPC), House of Commons
Debates, Vol. 145, No. 131, 3rd Sess., 40th Parl., February 15, 2011, at 8159: promising that the bill
will “ensure that all offenders will be treated equally, regardless of the nature of the crime they
commit, when it comes to eligibility for parole”.
14
While the Court did not engage closely with this evidence, some background helps to
assess both the optics of this legislation and the arguments advanced by the Crown in Whaling. The
Crown relied on a report issued by the Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel (Review
Panel), which criticized APR and asserted that individuals released under APR have “not proved as
effective as discretionary release in mitigating violent reoffending” (Whaling, supra, note 2, para. 6,
citing Report of the Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel: A Roadmap to Strengthening
Public Safety (2007) at 110). Government of Canada data does not, however, support that
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case concerned only section 10(1), which applied abolition retroactively to
any offenders currently serving sentences.15 The new law changed both the
timing and the process for early day parole and imposed a higher standard
to qualify. Day parole eligibility would now come only six months before
the full parole eligibility date — which is at one-third of the sentence.
Automatic referral to the Board was eliminated, and the paper review was
replaced by a hearing. The test for granting parole was now a more onerous
one of “undue risk to society” and discretion to deny was assigned to the
Board.16 Instead of APR, the normal parole provisions of the CCRA would
now apply.
The effect of the law was immediately to delay day parole eligibility
dates in the case of three prisoners who came forward with a legal
challenge: the delay was three months for Christopher Whaling, nine
months for Judith Slobbe, and 21 months for Cesar Maidana. They were
successful at each level of court. The trial judge and the British
Columbia Court of Appeal declared section 10(1) to be invalid to the
extent it made AEPA apply retroactively, on the basis of the right under
section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “... if
finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or
punished for it again”.17
The only live legal issue at the Supreme Court was the retroactivity
provision. Parliament’s intention for the provision appeared to be driven
by a single individual, thus raising the spectre of an unconstitutional
purpose. Earl Jones was a former Montreal investment advisor
who received a sentence of 11 years for fraud in February 2010.
A government research paper on AEPA stated explicitly that retroactivity

conclusion. Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Reports (released by Public Safety
Canada) in the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 indicate that the vast majority of prisoners released under
APR successfully completed parole with no new offences of any kind. The rate of violent offending
while released on this form of parole ranged recently from zero per cent to 0.8 per cent out of
hundreds of people each year — a lower rate than ordinary parole (recently between 0.4 per cent to
1.8 per cent). For critical discussion of the work conducted by the Review Panel, see Michael
Jackson and Graham Stewart, “A Flawed Compass: A Commentary on Bill C-43, An Act to amend
the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Criminal Code” (September, 2009).
15
The text of s. 10(1), AEPA reads: “Subject to subsection (2), the accelerated parole
review process set out in sections 125 to 126.1 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, as
those sections read on the day before the day on which section 5 comes into force, does not apply, as
of that day, to offenders who were sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary, whether the
sentencing, committal or transfer occurs before, on or after the day of that coming into force.”
16
CCRA, supra, note 8, s. 102.
17
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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would enable a post facto increase in the severity of punishment for
Jones.18 That sentiment was repeated in legislative debates by a Member
of Parliament who stated: “Unfortunately for the victims of Earl Jones, if
this bill is not retroactive, these victims will never have any kind of
justice served.”19 Justice Wagner, in his opinion for the Court, mentioned
these “troubling passages” from Hansard that were “suggestive of an
unconstitutional purpose”, but he proceeded to dispose of the appeal on
different grounds.20
The legal issue was framed as whether retroactive changes to parole
eligibility, which changed the length of time that the prisoners would be
held in custody rather than supervised in the community, amounted to
new punishment. The Court noted how this particular issue had not been
addressed in the few section (11)(h) decisions handed down to date. R. v.
Wigglesworth holds that protection against double jeopardy could be
triggered by additional proceedings that are criminal in nature and that
entail “true penal consequences”. 21 R. v. Rodgers deals with whether
imposing an additional consequence, namely a DNA sample order,
constitutes a new punishment.22 The issue in Whaling was different: there
was no new proceeding and no additional consequence added to the
punishment. Rather, legislation appeared to change the punishment itself.
The retroactive changes to parole eligibility modify the manner in which
an existing sanction is carried out.
Justice Wagner wrote that the change to parole eligibility is not a
second procedure as in Wigglesworth, and nor is it a discrete addition to
The reason for retroactivity is described as follows: “Bill C-59 provides for the
elimination of accelerated parole review for all those who had not received that review upon the
coming into force of the bill. This means that offenders sentenced before the coming into force of
Bill C-59 (such as Earl Jones) who have not served one sixth of their sentence upon its coming into
force will not be entitled to accelerated parole review.” Bill C-59: An Act to amend the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act (accelerated parole review) and to make consequential amendments to
other Acts, Publication No. 40-3-C59-E 11, February 2011, Lyne Casavant Dominique Valiquet
(Legal and Legislative Affairs Division Parliamentary Information and Research Service).
19
Remarks from Ms. Candice Hoeppner (Portage – Lisgar, CPC) House of Commons
Debates, Vol. 145, No. 131, 3rd Sess., 40th Parl., February 15, 2011, at 8205.
20
Whaling, supra, note 2, at para. 68.
21
[1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Wigglesworth”].
22
[2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 2006 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodgers”]. Holding that the
imposition of a DNA sample was not a new punishment. Justice Charron in Rodgers articulated a
two-part test for determining whether a consequence amounts to punishment for Charter purposes
(at para. 63): “when it forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in
respect of a particular offence and the sanction is one imposed in furtherance of the purpose and
principles of sentencing.” DNA samples are not part of the “arsenal of sanctions”. In Whaling,
Wagner J. said that changes to parole are similarly not part of the “arsenal of sanctions” (at para. 50).
18
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a sanction like the DNA order at issue in Rodgers. Rather, the issue here
is about the offender’s expectation about the original punishment or
sanction, and whether such expectations have been frustrated and
whether this constitutes new punishment. Accordingly, Wagner J. held
that the case introduces a new, third situation where the rule against
double jeopardy set out in section 11(h) may be violated. Where an
offender has been finally acquitted of, or finally found guilty and
punished for, an offence, section 11(h) now precludes the following
further state actions in relation to the same offence:
(a) from Wigglesworth: a proceeding that is criminal or quasi-criminal in
nature (being “tried ... again”);
(b) from Rodgers: an additional sanction or consequence that meets the
two-part Rodgers test for punishment (being “punished ... again”) in
that it is similar in nature to the types of sanctions available under the
Criminal Code and is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and
principles of sentencing; and
(c) from Whaling: retroactive changes to the conditions of the original
sanction which have the effect of adding to the offender’s
punishment (being “punished ... again”).
To repeat: the constitutionality of the repeal of the APR provisions was
not at issue in Whaling, but the Court held that the retroactive application
of that repeal, which altered the parole expectations of offenders who had
already been sentenced, violated section 11(h). Since section 10(1) of the
AEPA had the effect of automatically lengthening the offender’s period
of incarceration, as I discuss in more detail below, this represented to
Wagner J. one of the “clearest cases” of retroactive double punishment
for purposes of constitutional analysis. Finally, the infringement could
not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. The Court accepted,
though with a whisper of doubt,23 the Crown’s argument that the law had
a legitimate purpose. But the Crown failed to show that there was no less
intrusive alternative. One obvious option would have been to pass the
law with only prospective application.
The question that remains, and that I will now address, concerns
what other changes to a sanction could violate the rule announced in
23

As I note above, there was a hint in the judgment that the state purpose was
unconstitutional, at least in terms of the retroactivity provision, because it appeared driven by a
desire to enhance the punishment of a single individual and thus resembled a bill of attainder.
Whaling, supra, note 2, at para. 68.
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Whaling. What changes to a sanction will “have the effect of adding to
the offender’s punishment” and thus violate section 11(h)? The Whaling
Court attempts to announce a bright line rule: changes that automatically
increase the time spent physically inside prison will violate section 11(h)
if passed retroactively. I explain that reasoning in the following section.
I then critique the premise upon which that rule is built, showing that the
line it draws is far from bright.
1. Automatically Longer In-Prison Time
One issue at the heart of the Whaling litigation, which cut in favour of
the Crown’s position that this was not a change that constituted
“punishment”, was the fact that changes are regularly made to prison rules
and prison conditions after sentenced prisoners arrive without raising
constitutional concerns of the ex post facto or double jeopardy variety.
Specifically, the Whaling Court had to address the 1993 precedent of
Cunningham v. Canada,24 which seemed to hold that even significant postsentencing changes to parole do not run afoul of the Charter.
In Cunningham, as in Whaling, the prisoner complained about a
legislative change to parole that was created after he was sentenced. At
the time he was sentenced in 1981, Cunningham was presumptively
entitled to release after serving two-thirds of his sentence. A change in
1986 allowed the Commissioner of Corrections, in certain circumstances,
to refer the issue of his release to the National Parole Board. After a
hearing, Cunningham was ordered detained until his full sentence
expired. Justice McLachlin (as she then was), on behalf of a unanimous
Court, held that the change did not violate section 7 of the Charter.
Cunningham did experience a deprivation of liberty, but he had the
opportunity to satisfy the Parole Board as to his eligibility for release, by
way of a hearing and with access to counsel. The deprivation accorded
with the principles of fundamental justice.
The prospect of individualized treatment and procedural rights is
how Whaling distinguished Cunningham (along with the fact that the
earlier case was decided under section 7). Justice Wagner held that the
Whaling facts were at the extreme end of the continuum, inasmuch as it
involved a retroactive change to the rules governing parole eligibility that
had the effect of automatically lengthening the offender’s period of
incarceration. “A change that so categorically thwarts the expectation of
24

[1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”].
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liberty of an offender who has already been sentenced qualifies as one of
the clearest of cases of a retroactive change that constitutes double
punishment in the context of s. 11(h).”25 Justice Wagner bolstered his
reasoning by pointing to specific places where the Criminal Code
authorizes judges to consider the punitive effect of delayed parole
eligibility as a formal part of the sentence, suggesting that parole is often
a topic that falls within judicial rather than administrative authority.26
As I have noted, Whaling and his co-plaintiffs had already become
eligible for other release possibilities by the time judgment was handed
down, and APR remains abolished for all offenders sentenced after the
legislation came into force. The significance of the Whaling holding is thus
limited. More significant, as I discuss in the following section, is the
Court’s commitment to a doctrinal and conceptual divide between the
terms of imprisonment that courts consider an official part of the sentence
and those that amount to mere modes of sentence administration. After
Whaling, legislators and prison officials remain free to alter significant
features of the prison system, and criminal defendants have few
enforceable expectations as to what state punishment will constitute.
Practically speaking, the legal boundary between punishment and its
administration is an illusion. It is an illusion developed and deployed so as
to avoid the rule of law problem that emerged in the age of the penitentiary:
where state punishment entails the consignment of individuals to closed
institutions that are administered according to their own logic and
preferences.
2. The Punishment and its Administration: An Unstable Boundary
While not strictly necessary to dispose of the appeal, Wagner J. briefly
considers the general question as to what types of retroactive changes to
the conditions of a sentence will constitute double punishment. The case at
25

Whaling, supra, note 2, at para. 60.
See, for example, R. v. Wust, [2000] S.C.J. No. 19, 2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, at
para. 24 (S.C.C.): “Rarely is the sentencing court concerned with what happens after the sentence is
imposed, that is, in the administration of the sentence. Sometimes it is required to do so by
addressing, by way of recommendation, or in mandatory terms, a particular form of treatment for the
offender. For instance in murder cases, the sentencing court will determine a fixed term of parole
ineligibility: s. 745.4 of the Code.” Also, in R. v. Shropshire, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52, [1995] 4
S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.), Iacobucci J. noted that the duration of parole ineligibility is the only difference
in terms of punishment between first and second degree murder, which “clearly indicates that parole
ineligibility is part of the ‘punishment’ and thereby forms an important element of sentencing
policy” (at para. 23).
26
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bar created the “clearest of cases”, but he also contemplates what other
sorts of changes would qualify. Here, Wagner J. confirms the central
principle that divides the criminal and administrative dimensions of
punishment: that offenders have “constitutionally protected expectations as
to the duration, but not the conditions, of their sentences”.27
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) made a similar distinction in
Cunningham, in the context of section 7, regarding the qualitative aspects
or form of a sentence. The correctional authority will typically be free to
control and adjust these dimensions:
... A change in the form in which a sentence is served, whether it be
favourable or unfavourable to the prisoner, is not, in itself, contrary
to any principle of fundamental justice. Indeed, our system of
justice has always permitted correctional authorities to make
appropriate changes in how a sentence is served, whether the
changes relate to place, conditions, training facilities, or treatment.
Many changes in the conditions under which sentences are served
occur on an administrative basis in response to the prisoner’s
immediate needs or behaviour. Other changes are more general.
From time to time, for example, new approaches in correctional law
are introduced by legislation or regulation. These initiatives change
the manner in which some of the prisoners in the system serve their
sentences.28

The key judicial move reflected in this passage from Cunningham —
which Whaling and a great many other prison law cases endorse —
confirms the central fact of the penitentiary itself: that the correctional
authority has a great deal of freedom to adjust the conditions of prison
sentences. Both Cunningham and Whaling share a commitment to the
idea that internal aspects of prison regimes matter less than the allimportant question of whether an individual remains in physical custody.
As McLachlin J. (as she then was) put it in Cunningham: “...One has
‘more’ liberty, or a better quality of liberty, when one is serving time
on mandatory supervision than when one is serving time in prison”.29
Whaling confirms: “...Generally speaking, a retroactive change to the
conditions of a sentence will not be considered punitive if it does not
substantially increase the risk of additional incarceration”.30 In sum, both
cases agree that changes can be made to the conditions of a sentence, but
27
28
29
30

Whaling, supra, note 2, at para. 57.
Cunningham, supra, note 24, at 152-53.
Id., at 150.
Whaling, supra, note 2, at para. 63.
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where the result is a substantial increase in the risk of “additional
incarceration”, constitutional interests such as those in section 7 and
section 11(h) will be engaged. The Court confirms a boundary between
the conditions and the duration of punishment. Most “conditions” issues
will be left to the correctional authority; only “conditions” decisions that
affect the amount of “in-prison” time will engage constitutional interests.31
The point here is that while Cunningham and Whaling make clear that
“in-prison” time is a constitutionally-significant form of punishment, we
might also consider how “in-prison” time itself can be so differently
delivered and experienced. The deprivation of liberty is more or less
deeply felt in different prisons and according to the individual
backgrounds and characteristics of prisoners and correctional officers. The
effects of imprisonment are determined by material conditions such as the
size and age of the institution and the levels of staffing and crowding.
All imprisonment is not created equal. And the central features of
imprisonment change over time according to the government in power, the
culture among correctional employees, state economies, legislative and
policy shifts, rates of criminal offending and prosecution, and myriad other
factors. Prisoners adapt differently to prison life and to the institutional
changes that occur over time. Many of the qualitative terms of
imprisonment will be as or more important than the length of “in-prison”
time itself. Levels of reliance on prisoner segregation, as just one example,
change according to correctional mood and prisoner demographics.32
As Michel Foucault described so well, the rise of the penitentiary in
the late 18th century marked a shift away from more specific and
concrete sanctions like banishment or physical punishments. When
31
This might be a good place to mention that R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 3, 74 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), is in direct conflict with both Cunningham and Whaling. In the
provincial jail system considered in Shubley, the prison disciplinary board had the power, among
other things, to cancel 15 days of remission entitlement earned by the prisoner. (The remission
penalty could be longer with the permission of the Minister: Ministry of Correctional Services Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 275, s. 31(1).) The case concerned the alteration of “in-prison” time: it should have
attracted Charter protection rather than being characterized as a benign administrative measure by
the majority.
32
Indeed, the use of administrative segregation is increasing. In 2012-2013, there were
8,221 admissions into segregation, up from 7,137 in 2003-2004. (Statistics provided by the CSC and
obtained through Access to Information.) See Kathleen Harris, “Isolation of Inmates Rising in
Crowded Prisons”, CBC News (August 6 2013), online: <www.cbc.ca>. In his Annual Report
from 2013-2014, the Correctional Investigator reported a 6.4 per cent increase in administrative
segregation over the preceding five years. In that year, there were 8,328 administrative segregation
placements, with an average count of 850 segregated offenders per day. See Canada, Office of the
Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2013-2014, by Howard Sapers, Catalogue No. PS1002014E-PDF (Ottawa: OCI, 2014), at 32.
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punishment for serious offences means time spent in the physical custody
of the state, officials are free to “modulate” the severity of a judicially
imposed sanction. It is prison officials — not courts — that control the
administration, quality and rigours of punishment.33 Canadian sentencing
law, however, is premised on the assumption that sentencing courts must
impose a “fit sentence” which is proportionate to the seriousness of the
offence.34 It is difficult to square the concern with fitness and desert in
the judicially imposed sanction with the power of prison officials (and
legislators) to modulate the severity of punishment in the course of its
administration.
Perhaps most significantly, the conditions of imprisonment directly
impact both “in-prison” time and the duration of the sentence itself.35 These
facts become visible if we travel just one or two links down the “conditions”
causal chain. The accrual of prison disciplinary convictions, for example, is
a proper factor for penal authorities to consider in exercising discretion on
early release applications. In addition, prison staff make recommendations as
to release, based on their personal experience with the prisoner, that are
heavily relied upon by parole authorities. And the behaviour of prisoners can
be linked to factors like crowding and access to meaningful activities. The
effects of time in segregation and other prison experiences can bear upon the
future prospects of prisoners, in terms of their mental health, their relations
with correctional officers, and their reputation in the prisoner society. In
other words, the prisoner’s ability to access treatment and perform well in
the prison environment is actually what comes to determine his chance of
early release to the community and, potentially, his prospects of returning to
prison under new convictions. In this way, the quality of punishment can be
constitutive not only of the severity of punishment but the prison population
itself.36
33
See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan
Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), at 244-47.
34
See, for example, Wilson J. in her concurring judgment in Reference re Motor Vehicle
Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 533 (S.C.C.): “It is
basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bear some relationship to the offence; it
must be a ‘fit’ sentence proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. Only if this is so can the
public be satisfied that the offender ‘deserved’ the punishment he received and feel a confidence in
the fairness and rationality of the system.”
35
Remember that neither Whaling nor Cunningham were about duration. Changes to parole
do not change the length of a sentence — parole is about the place that the sentence is served. For
discussion see Cunningham, supra, note 24, at 150.
36
This reasoning appears in a recent decision upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
A California federal court held that prison overcrowding in that state was perpetuating a
“criminogenic prison system that itself threatens public safety.” Levels of crowding and staffing,
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Judges are politically responsible for imposing a fit sanction, so the
legal system clings to the story that the power to stipulate punishment
belongs with the judicial authority. The only way to normatively sustain
the system is to characterize the powers exercised by prison officials as
administrative — as not the real sanction. In direct and indirect ways,
however, the prison regime influences both the severity and length of
confinement. Judges do not run prisons and for that reason they must
delegate the delivery of the punishment. The exercise of delegated power
comes to shape the actual punishment on significant quantitative and
qualitative dimensions. The idea of a boundary between judicial and
administrative powers is central to the legal story told about prisons, but
it does not reflect how punishment unfolds on the ground.37

II. THE KHELA “VICTORY”: PRISONER TRANSFERS
ACCORDING TO LAW
For many of the everyday aspects of prison administration in
Canada, legislation governs how authority is to be exercised, and
prisoners can bring administrative law challenges in Federal Court to
insist upon adherence to the legislative scheme. When constitutional
issues are engaged, provincial superior courts also have jurisdiction to
hear claims. And when decisions implicate the residual liberty that
prisoners retain under section 7 of the Charter, prisoners can seek either a
judicial review in Federal Court or a writ of habeas corpus in superior
provincial court. 38 Litigation on this topic has centred on maintaining
access to the writ and, recently, on the standard of judicial review that
applies under it.

along with denials of mental and physical health care, meant that the prison system was itself a cause
of criminal offending. Juris. Statement App., O. T. 2009, No. 09-416 at 186a, upheld in Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
37
For a thoughtful treatment of exceptions to the general claim I am making here, see
Benjamin L. Berger, “Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope” in Dwight Newman &
Malcolm Thorburn, eds., The Dignity of Law: The Legacy of Justice Louis LeBel (Toronto, ON:
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2015). Berger points to places where the Supreme Court of Canada has
called on judges to think about sentencing in ways “better attuned to the lived experience of
punishment”, including in cases concerning police misconduct, collateral consequences and delayed
parole.
38
Since 1985, habeas corpus has been available to free inmates from restrictive forms of
custody within an institution: Miller trilogy, supra, note 5.
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Before I turn to the Khela case, which considers the current scope of
habeas corpus protection, I will provide the basic legal background to
the standard habeas corpus proceeding. Legislative provisions in the
CCRA govern the assignment and transfer of inmates within the federal
prison system. When an inmate is first assigned to a penitentiary,
section 28 of the CCRA requires that his or her assignment be to “an
environment that contains only the necessary restrictions” taking into
account the safety and security of the public, the inmate, and other
persons in the facility. Before placement of the inmate, the prison service
is directed to consider issues like accessibility to the inmate’s community
and the availability of programs. As part of the assignment process, the
inmate is given one of three security-classifications: maximum, medium
or minimum. Each security level correlates with three factors: the
probability of escape; the risk to public safety in the event of escape; and
the degree of supervision and control required within the penitentiary.39
The prison is empowered to transfer inmates between institutions in
the course of sentence administration. Inmates are entitled to notice
before transfer, including the reasons for it.40 This provision is waived
where an immediate transfer is necessary to “preserve the security of the
facility or the safety of the inmate or of any other person”. In an
emergency transfer, the institutional head or staff members must meet
with the inmate within two days, and “explain the reasons for the transfer
and give him an opportunity to make representations regarding the
transfer in person or in writing”. If the inmate so chooses, the inmate’s
representations are sent to the decision-maker. The decision-maker must
provide a final decision in writing within five working days after the
final decision is made.
The parameters of the right to receive information and make
representations with regard to a transfer decision — central to the
outcome in Khela — are governed by section 27 of the CCRA. The
provision makes clear that the inmate is to receive “all the information to
be considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that
information”. The only exception is where there are “reasonable
grounds” to believe that the disclosure of information would jeopardize
39
Section 18 of SOR/92-620 [hereinafter “Regulations”]. See also s. 30 of the CCRA and
s. 17 of the Regulations, which directs security classification to consider particular factors. The
federal prison service also makes use of a Security Reclassification Scale (SRS), the use of which is
governed by Commissioner’s Directive 710-6. The SRS is a research-based actuarial tool developed
to determine the appropriate level of security at key points during an offender’s sentence.
40
CCRA, supra, note 8, s. 29; s. 12, Regulations.
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the safety of any person, the security of a penitentiary, or the conduct of
any lawful investigation.41 Where those exceptions are invoked, as much
information may be withheld as is “strictly necessary” in order to protect
those three specified instances.

1. The Khela Facts
In Mission Institution v. Khela, a federal prisoner was the subject of
an emergency involuntary transfer from a medium to a maximumsecurity prison. The Court described the events surrounding the transfer
as follows: 42 On September 23, 2009, an inmate was stabbed after
arriving to Mission Institution, the medium-security facility where Khela
had resided for three years. One week after the stabbing, the Security
Intelligence Office at Mission received information implicating Khela in
the incident. On February 2, 2010, that office completed a Security
Intelligence Report (“Security Report”) that contained information that
Khela had hired two other inmates to carry out the stabbing in exchange
for heroin. As a result of the Security Report, Khela was transferred to
the maximum-security prison.
On February 4, 2010, Khela received an “Assessment for Decision”
(“Assessment”) and a “Notice of Emergency Involuntary Transfer
Recommendation” (“Notice”). The Assessment indicated that the
primary reason for the transfer was the Security Report. The Assessment
stated that the Warden came to this conclusion on the basis of
anonymous information received from “three separate and distinct
sources”. It was clear that these sources were Khela’s fellow inmates.
The Assessment did not contain information with respect to the sources’
names, what they said or why they might be considered reliable. The
Notice confirmed that Khela’s medium-security classification was
overridden so as to transfer him. On February 26, 2010, Khela submitted
a written rebuttal, which asked that the scoring matrix used to determine
his ranking be disclosed to him together with the Security Report, in
addition to information on why the “sources” should be considered
reliable and how the Warden had determined that they were reliable.
On March 15, 2010, Khela received a response indicating that the
Warden’s final decision was to transfer him to the maximum-security
facility. The Warden responded to the inquiry about the credibility of the
41
42

Id., s. 27.
I am drawing here from Khela, supra, note 3, at paras. 7-12.
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sources by stating that the information received was believed reliable
because of the expertise and policies of the security intelligence
officers. On April 27, 2010, Khela filed a notice that he would be
making a habeas corpus application in the British Columbia Supreme
Court. The application was heard by Bruce J. on May 11, 2010.
Ten days later, Bruce J. granted the writ and ordered that Khela be
returned to the general population of Mission Institution, the mediumsecurity facility, though he was subsequently returned to maximumsecurity in a further decision that was upheld. The first transfer was
thus factually moot when it came before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court nevertheless heard the appeal on the basis that the factual
circumstances of transfer decisions change quickly and are therefore
elusive of review.43
Three issues addressed in the Khela decision merit attention: (1) the
concurrent jurisdiction of provincial superior courts and the Federal
Court; (2) the procedural unfairness of the transfer decision; (3) the
standard of review that applies regarding the substance of a transfer
decision in habeas corpus proceedings. The first two issues are as
straightforward and easy as the third is complex.
(a) Concurrent Jurisdiction
The topic of concurrent jurisdiction was dealt with in the 1985
Miller trilogy and repeated in May v. Ferndale, where the Court took
pains to distinguish between habeas corpus in provincial superior
courts and judicial review in the Federal Court and to reiterate that the
prisoner is free to choose between them. Subsequent to May, government
lawyers continued to resist the rule on concurrent jurisdiction in various
ways. 44 The Khela Court repeated the key holding in May: that
provincial superior courts retain jurisdiction to review prison transfers,
43
Id., at para. 14. The Court’s decision on mootness, though covered in a single paragraph,
is a significant aspect of the judgment. The Court displayed real appreciation of prison realities —
namely that decisions involving the transfer and segregation of inmates can change quickly and
thereby evade appellate review — along with a commitment to developing the law that applies to
prisoners.
44
At times, such arguments are based on s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F7, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Court to issue specified relief against any
federal board, commission or other tribunal. As Khela confirms, however: habeas corpus was
“deliberately omitted” from the list of writs set out in s. 18. (Also, see Miller, supra, note 5, at 624-26.)
Jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus with regard to inmates clearly remains with provincial superior
courts.
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and federal prisoners should not be forced to go through the judicial
review process in Federal Court. 45 While May affirmed two possible
instances in which a provincial superior court could refuse habeas
corpus applications, those two possibilities were still absent and the
prison in Khela did not argue otherwise.46
The Khela decision reiterates the major remedial and procedural
differences between judicial review in Federal Court and habeas
corpus, which justify preserving prisoner access to the latter. A habeas
corpus application in the provincial court system requires only
six days’ notice, versus the 160 days that could be required under the
judicial review process to proceed to hearing. 47 The habeas corpus
application triggers a non-discretionary hearing, and the burden of
proof falls on the warden once a legitimate issue about a deprivation of
liberty has been raised.48 In contrast, judicial review through a federal
court is a discretionary remedy, and the onus is on the prisoner to show
that a transfer has been unreasonable. In addition, provincial courts can
provide local access and are expert in the constitutional rights at stake
for prisoners who are transferred to higher security facilities.49 Finally,
the Court held that the vulnerability of prisoners and the realities of
confinement mean that inmates should have the ability to choose
between the forums and remedies available to them. 50

45
Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 49: “The history and nature of the remedy, combined
with what this Court has said on this issue in the past, unequivocally support a finding that
favours access to justice for prisoners, namely that of concurrent jurisdiction. As the majority
stated in May at para. 72: ‘[t]imely judicial oversight, in which provincial superior courts must
play a concurrent if not predominant role, is still necessary to safeguard the human rights and
civil liberties of prisoners….’”
46
May, supra, note 5, at paras. 44-50: Provincial superior courts should decline habeas
corpus jurisdiction only where (1) a statute, such as the Criminal Code, confers jurisdiction on a
court of appeal to correct the errors of a lower court and release the applicant if need be; or (2) the
legislator has put in place complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for review of an
administrative decision, such as the scheme created by Parliament for immigration matters. The
Khela Court observes, at para. 42, that the first exception clearly does not apply, and “the appellants
have offered no argument to suggest that the transfer and review process of CSC has, since May,
become a ‘complete, comprehensive and expert procedure’”.
47
Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 46. See also para. 61 for discussion of the requirement that
prisoners exhaust the internal grievance system before challenging a decision in Federal Court for
want of procedural fairness and for unreasonableness. Even if an inmate’s complaint is designated as
a high priority, it can take 90 days to reach final decision. May also enumerates the inadequacies of
the internal grievance system.
48
Id., at paras. 40-41 and 48.
49
Id., at paras. 45 and 47.
50
Id., at para. 44.
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(b) Disclosure/Procedural Fairness
The prison in Khela lost on procedural fairness, where the Court held
that the standard of judicial review “will continue to be ‘correctness’”.51
The problem was a lack of compliance with the legislative transfer rules,
outlined above. Recall that an inmate is entitled to make representations
about the transfer decision, and section 27(1) of the CCRA provides that
the decision-maker must give him “all the information” to be considered
in taking a final decision regarding the transfer. Even inmates transferred
on an emergency and involuntary basis, as Khela was, are entitled to “all
the information” considered in the Warden’s decision-making process, or
a summary thereof. Prison officials are only required to disclose the
evidence that was considered in the decision; the standard is less onerous
than the criminal law disclosure standard where innocence is at stake.52
The only exception is when the security concerns set out in section 27(3)
are specifically invoked:
… where the Commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that
disclosure … would jeopardize (a) the safety of any person, (b) the
security of a penitentiary, or (c) the conduct of a lawful investigation,
he or she may authorize the withholding from the inmate of as much
information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest that
would be jeopardized.53

The prison failed to invoke section 27(3) in the Khela proceedings, such
that the exception was not applicable. The Warden failed to disclose
information about the reliability of the sources, the specific statements made
by the sources, and the scoring matrix that informed Khela’s security
classification. 54 The prison failed to lead any evidence (including the
possibility of a sealed affidavit) to suggest that their withholding of
information related to the permitted statutory concerns. Khela was not
provided with sufficient information to “know the case to be met”.55 The
decision was procedurally unfair and therefore unlawful.56
51

Id., at para. 79.
For the more onerous criminal law standard, see R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 343 (S.C.C.).
53
Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 84 (emphasis added).
54
Id., at para. 93. The fact that the Warden overrode the SRS does not matter. The
important thing is that it was considered prior to being overridden: paras. 96-97.
55
Id., at para. 94.
56
Though the Court made clear, at para. 90, that not all breaches of the CCRA or the
Regulations will be unfair. It will be up to the reviewing judge to determine whether a given breach
resulted in procedural unfairness.
52
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(c) Standard of Review of the Transfer Decision
In a more complex part of the Khela decision, the Court went on to
determine the standard of review for transfer decisions. In the past, the
question on habeas corpus had always been articulated as whether the
confinement was “lawful”.57 But here the prison takes another crack at
limiting provincial superior court jurisdiction by suggesting that the
reviewing court could not assess the merits of a transfer decision.58 The
Court rejects that position, largely by repeating its reasoning about the
importance of the habeas corpus remedy and the need to avoid placing
burdens on prisoners and requiring duplicative procedures in Federal
Court.59
While Khela rejects an extremely narrow conception of habeas
review, the decision imports, for the first time, the administrative law
standard of “reasonableness”. 60 This was a hotly debated issue at oral
57
For example, the language of the Magna Carta, cited in May, supra, note 5, at para. 19,
was that “no free man shall be seized or imprisoned except by the lawful judgment of his equals or
by the law of the land.” Section 10 of the Charter states, that “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or
detention … (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be
released if the detention is not lawful.” The 1985 Miller trilogy and May both refer to the need for
habeas corpus to be available to prisoners to challenge “unlawful” deprivations of liberty from
within the prison context. (May, supra, note 5, at para. 32)
58
The Crown cited trial decisions that seemed to support this position, such as in
Williams v. Smith-Black, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1757, 2008 BCSC 1250, at para. 29 (B.C.S.C.):
“…Habeas corpus does not open the door to a whole scale review of the merits of the
administrative decision. Habeas corpus will only issue where the decision-maker has acted
without jurisdiction. A disagreement as to the facts… does not amount to a jurisdictional
error….” The Crown admitted, however, that there were conflicting trial decisions on this
issue, including, for example, Caouette v. Mission Institution, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1039, 2010
BCSC 769 at para. 62 (B.C.S.C.): “…a writ [of habeas corpus] may issue if the transfer
decision was not reasonably open to the Warden on the evidence. I am of the view that while
this court must treat the decisions of statutory decision-makers with appropriate deference, an
inmate may seek a review of the merits of a warden’s decision that curtails his liberty by way
of an application to a provincial superior court for relief in the nature of habeas corpus.”
59
Khela, supra, note 3, at paras. 51-74. See especially para. 69 where the Court rejects
the Crown submission that jurisdictional error alone determines “lawfulness”. Also, at para.
66, the Court responds to the fact that the Crown had partially relied on “Dain J.’s conclusions
in Miller ... that certiorari in aid cannot be employed to convert an application for habeas
corpus into an appeal on the merits (p. 632)”. The Khela Court points out that Le Dain J. was
simply echoing earlier decisions specifying that habeas corpus cannot be used to appeal a
conviction, given that the Criminal Code confers jurisdiction on courts of appeal to review
convictions. This obviously could not be interpreted as a rule that provincial superior courts
may not rule on the substance of an administrative decision. Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 66.
60
Now referred to as “Dunsmuir” reasonableness, after the case that abolished “patent
unreasonableness” and settled on the two standards of “reasonableness” and “correctness” for
judicial review of administrative decisions: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008]
1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”].
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argument, and it provoked disagreement even within the plaintiff-side
members of the prison law bar, including between Allan Manson on
behalf of the interveners The John Howard Society of Canada and the
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Society, and Michael Jackson
on behalf of the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association. Jackson accepted that reasonableness could be an
appropriate standard for a limited number of issues on habeas review.
Manson objected on the grounds that reasonableness entails
deference, which is a standard that is “inconsistent with the strict onus
of proof borne by the detaining authority” on habeas corpus. 61 The
Dunsmuir standard contemplates a range of reasonable alternatives. 62
The question on habeas corpus, however, is different. As Manson put
it: “Either the detaining authority proves the legality of the
deprivation of liberty, or the applicant must be released. There is no
‘range of possible acceptable outcomes’ which is the principle
underlying reasonableness. It is either or.”63
Perhaps Manson’s most compelling point involved his call for the
Court to develop the law of habeas corpus in its own context, without
importing administrative law principles developed in a different
setting. Manson’s position seems particularly apt in light of the
multiple paragraphs in Khela dedicated to emphasizing the unique
history of the “great writ”; with the Court expounding on its status as
“an essential remedy” to protect two fundamental Charter rights and
the need for it to be interpreted purposively and expansively.64 And
yet, after all that, the Khela judgment arrives at the conclusion that
the judicial powers of review under the “great writ” are at least partly
akin to those exercised in contemporary administrative law.
The issue of what legality or lawfulness means in this context did
require some clarification in the years leading up to Khela. But the best
61

Factum of the interveners The John Howard Society of Canada and the Canadian
Association of Elizabeth Fry Society in Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 9.
62
See Dunsmuir, supra, note 60, at para. 47: “Reasonableness is a deferential standard
animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of
reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to
one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable
conclusions.” Also Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, [2009] 1
S.C.R. 339, at para. 59 (S.C.C.): “Where the reasonableness standard applies, it requires deference. ...
There might be more than one reasonable outcome.”
63
Factum of the interveners The John Howard Society of Canada and the Canadian
Association of Elizabeth Fry Society in Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 9.
64
See, for example, Khela, id., at paras. 27-30.
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guidance could be found in the following paragraph from May v.
Ferndale, which does not mention administrative standards of review:
A deprivation of liberty will only be lawful where it is within the
jurisdiction of the decision-maker. Absent express provision to
the contrary, administrative decisions must be made in accordance with
the Charter. Administrative decisions that violate the Charter are null
and void for lack of jurisdiction: Slaight Communications Inc. v.
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at p. 1078. Section 7 of the Charter
provides that an individual’s liberty cannot be impinged upon except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Administrative
decisions must also be made in accordance with the common law duty
of procedural fairness and requisite statutory duties. Transfer decisions
engaging inmates’ liberty interest must therefore respect those
requirements.65

May did not frame the issue as whether courts can review the
“reasonableness” of an impugned decision. Rather, the language from
May suggests that there are two central issues on habeas corpus. After
the inmate proves that liberty has been deprived and the onus shifts to the
detaining authority, the questions that section 7 demands are: (1) Did
the decision-maker comply with requisite statutory duties? (2) Did the
decision-maker follow procedural fairness? The onus is on the prison to
prove both. Rather than import an ambiguous concept of reasonableness,
it seems that courts could just continue to ask those questions.
2. The Uncertain Meaning of Reasonableness
There are at least three reasons why it is not clear what
reasonableness review in the habeas corpus context means after Khela.
First, the Court emphasizes that reasonableness review should not change
“the basic structure or benefits of the writ”.66 One wonders, then, what if
any change is being effected, and why. Second, the Court makes clear
that reasonableness does not necessarily apply to all of the flaws in the
decision or the decision-making process, but the judgment does not
specify what the list includes.67 Finally, the transfer decision in Khela
itself is not reviewed for reasonableness, because the Court finds that the

65
66
67

May, supra, note 5, at para. 77.
Khela, supra, note 3, at para. 77.
Id., at para. 79.

256

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

process was procedurally unfair.68 So there was no concrete application
of the standard in the case itself.
What the Court seems to envision is that reasonableness could apply
to certain aspects of decisions that wardens make pursuant to the
statutory criteria, but the Court does not specify which decisions or
which statutory criteria. Consider one possibility: section 27(3) of the
CCRA, discussed above, which allows wardens to refrain from
disclosing information to inmates in the face of specific security
concerns. In future cases, when wardens invoke this provision, Khela
suggests that courts should review that decision on a deferential
reasonableness standard, though the authorities will have to explain
their determination.69 The warden’s decision will be unreasonable, and
therefore unlawful, if an inmate’s liberty interests are sacrificed “absent
any evidence” or “on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence” or
“evidence that cannot support the conclusion”.70
But consider the actual language of section 27(3), which already
allows the withholding of information from inmates on “reasonable
grounds”. The statute permits the warden to make a decision on reasonable
grounds regarding this specific topic. The provision was undoubtedly
written that way because wardens need some space to operate on this
issue. It follows that reviewing statutory compliance on habeas corpus
already entailed an element of deference on that issue. From this angle, the
Khela holding might just echo how habeas corpus already worked. But a
second possibility also arises. Future courts might find that the question of
whether the warden found objectively “reasonable grounds” should itself
be reviewed on a deferential reasonableness standard. In this second
scenario, the level of constitutional protection for prisoners stands to be
lower than the conception of “lawfulness” in May that required adherence
to statutory criteria.
At the very least, and perhaps most problematic for the field of
prison law, importing a reasonableness standard is bound to generate
further litigation. For that reason, the Khela decision threatens to
generate a new barrier for prisoners to access justice, in a way that runs
contrary to the central principles of habeas corpus. Any satisfaction
derived from creating conceptual harmony between administrative law
and habeas corpus does not seem worth the cost.
68

Id., at para. 80.
Id., at para. 74.
70
Id., at para. 74: specifying that the possibility of a decision being unreasonable on other
grounds is not foreclosed.
69
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3. Warden as Decision-maker
The Court’s motivation for importing the standard of reasonableness
to habeas corpus seems to have been tied to a set of assumptions about
the prison context, where several of the Court’s remarks stand out. The
Court characterizes an involuntary transfer decision as an “administrative
decision made by a decision maker with expertise in the environment of
a particular penitentiary”. 71 The Court says further that to apply any
standard other than reasonableness in reviewing such a decision could
well lead to the “micromanagement of prisons by the courts”.72
These kinds of statements appear often in prison decisions,73 but one
wonders what they mean, especially here. After all, the question is not
whether the Court has jurisdiction over the proceedings; the question is
not whether this is an issue that engages Charter rights or administrative
law or the “great writ” of habeas. The subject matter is squarely and
properly before the Court, because it involves the deprivation of residual
liberty and the right against arbitrary detention that inmates retain. In this
sense a prisoner transfer is more than an “administrative decision” and
the question is not about “micromanagement” but about checking for
compliance with a legal regime that implicates the Charter.
It goes without saying that a reviewing court on habeas corpus will
examine the warden’s account of whether and how she complied with
her governing legislation. Equally obvious: the warden is located in a
unique penitentiary context, and the security concerns that she faces may
be part of how her decisions are made. (In the example of section 27(3),
as I have noted, she is already entitled to make a decision based on
“reasonable grounds” related to prison security.) And, surely there will
be cases in which the warden’s expertise in the particular security matrix
71

Id., at para. 75.
Id.
73
Re Cline (1981), Court No. T-894-81 (F.C.T.D.) (“judges, as a general rule, should avoid
the temptation of using their ex officio wisdom in the solemn, dignified and calm atmosphere of the
court-room and substituting their own judgment for that of experienced prison administrators. The
latter are truly in the firing-line and are charged by society with the extraordinarily difficult and
unenviable task of maintaining order and discipline among hundreds of convicted criminals, who, as
a class, are not generally reputed to be the most disciplined or emotionally stable members of society
and who, by the mere fact of incarceration, are being forcibly deprived of many of their most
fundamental freedoms.”) Similar statements appear in Hnatiuk v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1987]
F.C.J. No. 624, 12 F.T.R. 44, at 49 (F.C.T.D.); Evans v. Lusk, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2802 (B.C.S.C.),
and others. While there is little doubt that prisons present a unique context within which to analyze
constitutional compliance, there is no principled reason why a special doctrine of enhanced
deference need apply. For discussion and argument see Lisa Kerr, “Contesting Expertise in Prison
Law” (2014) 60:1 McGill L.J. 43-94.
72
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of her penitentiary will inform her actions, and this will be revealed to
the reviewing court. The warden may explain, for example, that
disclosure of particular information to an inmate in a particular prison
would be tantamount to adding a match to a tinderbox. Reviewing courts
could, in many cases, find that evidence to be convincing.
There could be other cases, however, in which the facts will suggest
that a warden’s decision is more connected to neglect or animus than to
expertise or legitimate concerns. In other words, the time for respecting
her analysis may come, and it might be encouraged in the legislation
itself as with section 27(3). But it need not be built into the
jurisprudential standard. As Professor Jackson stated in his oral
submissions at the Khela hearing: “there are situations where you cut the
Warden some slack. But deference as a broad-based approach to
correctional decision-making runs the risk of returning prisons to the preMartineau [Martineau v. Matsqui Institution, [1979] S.C.J. No. 121,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 (S.C.C.)] context, where wardens were virtually
invulnerable to review by the courts.”74
Central to this argument is the issue of what we should expect from
particular kinds of decision-makers, and how that expectation should
inform the level of judicial scrutiny on Charter-based review. Audrey
Macklin makes this point in her critique of recent changes to the law that
governs administrative discretion and the Charter emerging from Doré v.
Barreau du Québec. 75 The Doré case involved the decision of a
provincial law society to discipline a lawyer for writing an intemperate
letter to a judge. The lawyer complained that the decision violated his
Charter-protected right of free expression. In the course of upholding the
decision of the law society, the Court appears to shrink the ambit of
correctness review by preferring a deferential reasonableness standard
for questions of constitutionality that arise in the individual exercise of
discretion.76
74

While Professor Jackson did not entirely resist the idea of reasonableness review in oral
argument at the Khela hearing, he was emphatic that the issues of lack of procedural fairness,
unreliable evidence, and breach of statutory duty should all be a matter of correctness. He said there
should be “no wholesale review for reasonableness” even if reasonableness applies to some aspect of
the warden’s decision. If Professor Jackson’s conception of reasonableness governs future cases, the
concerns expressed in this article will be alleviated. The worry is that importing reasonableness
creates uncertainty (requiring litigation that prisoners cannot easily bring) and that the Court
expresses and condones a general tone of judicial deference to prison administrators.
75
[2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.).
76
Macklin, “Charter Right”, supra, note 6, at 569-70. There are, however, already signs that
the Doré approach, which includes additional elements not discussed in this article, may be shortlived. Most recently, in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12,
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As Macklin puts it, Doré presumes that the administrative decisionmaker will generally be in the best position to consider the impact of the
relevant Charter values on the specific facts of the case.77 But of course,
the decision-maker in Doré was a body of lawyers performing oversight
for their own profession. One question is whether the same expectations
and presumptions should extend to decision-makers who are nonlawyers. In some cases, Macklin argues, decisions assigned to elected
officials might deserve deference on the basis that they will be exposed
to political rather than legal accountability. In other cases, proximity to
the political branch could pull in the opposite direction, given the
incentives that might call for minimizing individual rights in the name of
political gain. The point is that justifications for deference will not be
identical across administrative settings.
Macklin’s concerns apply with force here, and should be analyzed in
light of the purpose of habeas corpus and the realities of the penal
context. Doré has yet to officially arrive to the prison law context, but
the Khela decision imports part of the Doré rationale when it imports
reasonableness to habeas corpus, and raises the prospect that
reasonableness could be extended to other Charter complaints arising
from the prison context. The worry is that prison officials, like certain
other administrative actors, often have a narrow focus that is “coloured
by the concerns and possibly the biases of their own professional
culture”.78 They operate in a closed, largely inscrutable environment with
unique pressures and concerns and little political or legal accountability.
As Macklin notes more generally, there is simply no basis for a
presumption that certain officials should receive deference when they
exercise their Charter-impacting discretion.79 The arguments about why
courts should defer to the exercise of non-Charter matters (or non-habeas
matters) do not automatically extend to those aspects of discretion that
implicate habeas corpus and the Charter.
2015 SCC 12 (S.C.C.), three judges (McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver J., joined by Rothstein J.)
decided the case without using or referring to Doré. For discussion, see Walters, “Respecting
Deference as Respect”, supra, note 6, at 422.
77
Macklin, “Charter Right”, supra, note 6, at 575.
78
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 625.
79
If the official does a good job, as some will, then that can simply be explained to the Court
and the Court will be persuaded. As Macklin puts it: “sometimes the reasons may be persuasive, and a
judge should be as open to benefiting from a rigorous and compelling set of reasons in the same way he
or she is open to persuasion from high-quality submissions by counsel, analyses by law clerks or
opinions of fellow judges.” (Macklin, “Charter Right”, supra, note 6, at 576)
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Prison officials are not likely to impress when they make decisions
that implicate Charter rights. To the limited extent that staff training
involves the law, the focus is on prison law and policy rather than the
Constitution. Prison staff focus on the task of “processing inmates
efficiently and avoiding visible disruption” rather than pursuing a larger
normative agenda. 80 The organizational dynamics of prisons tend to
resist constitutional constraints, due to the political powerlessness of
inmates and the structural isolation of corrections from the community.81
The status of the inmate is defined in relation to managerial goals, rather
than in relation to an externally defined moral norm, and prison
managers tend to focus on their vision of scientific management rather
than the larger legal order.82 Amid these institutional tendencies, only the
judiciary has the inclination and ability to impose a regular and
comprehensive legal framework. The judiciary is a necessary player in
prison legality, rather than a necessarily amateur outsider at risk of
“micromanagement”. The spirit of habeas corpus, with its strict
emphasis on legality and access to justice so as to challenge deprivations
imposed on the physical body, has always had this in mind. If the Court
imported reasonableness because of a fantasy of prisons as legally expert
institutions that would be weakened by judicial scrutiny, the judgment
seems deeply misguided.

III. CONCLUSION
In two significant respects, Khela held the ground of modern prison law.
When prisoners are deprived of the residual liberty that they retain while
incarcerated, the Court protects a tradition of capacious access to the courts
and insists that officials abide by the details of their governing legislation.
But the marriage of habeas corpus with administrative law standards is a
potentially troubling shift — one that seems to minimize the distinct status
of habeas corpus as a strict check on the legality of deprivations imposed on
the physical body. At the very least, the topic will invite more litigation, as
government lawyers may finally relinquish their wish to abolish provincial
superior court jurisdiction and transfer energy to defending a wide range of
“reasonable” penal powers in habeas corpus review.
Susan Sturm, “Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in
Prisons” (1990) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805, at 810-20.
81
Id., at 816.
82
Id., at 818.
80
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Several of the Court’s remarks in Khela, particularly about the need
not to second-guess the determinations of prison officials, seem to
endorse a view that David Dyzenhaus has called “submissive
deference”.83 Under this approach, the central question on judicial review
is whether a government official is qualified to exercise authority, but the
law has little preference as to which decision is selected from within a
range of possibilities. The alternative is where judicial deference is
something to be earned. As Dyzenhaus puts it, “deference as respect”
is granted only when officials engage in reasoned justification of
governmental decisions.84 In my discussion of section 27(3) of the CCRA,
I described how the provision contemplates that wardens may earn
judicial deference in specific circumstances, such as where legitimate
security concerns prevent the disclosure of information to inmates being
involuntarily transferred. Rather than emphasizing that the statute already
allows wardens space to operate, the Khela decision suggests a space that
law does not cover.
My central argument about the Whaling decision is that it relies on
an unstable boundary between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
imprisonment, between the formal sentence imposed by sentencing
courts and the features of punishment that follow from sentence
administration. The boundary between duration and conditions is
integral to the idea of the penitentiary as a place for the administration of
state punishment. But it is only an idea — a comforting one perhaps for
those concerned with the rule of law in punitive state institutions — but
not reflected in the daily exercise of power inside prisons. Perhaps most
importantly, the conditions of punishment can determine in concrete
ways the length of time that liberty will be, in the end, deprived.
While the Whaling case counts as a prisoner victory, it affirms that
most post-sentencing changes to parole will not raise ex post facto or
double jeopardy concerns, so long as some individualized administrative
process is in place to prevent the automatic addition of “in-prison” time.
The government will have little difficulty enacting retroactive laws that
pass muster for the small slice of prison conditions deemed Charterrelevant in this way.
83
David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279, at
286 [hereinafter “Dyzenhaus, ‘Politics of Deference’”]. For the larger theory of law and democracy
that underpins the Dyzenhausian view, see Walters, “Respecting Deference as Respect”, supra, note 6,
at 417-22.
84
Dyzenhaus, “Politics of Deference”, id., at 307.
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What ties these two cases together is how they both allow the prison
context, rather than legislative or judicial action, to determine central
features of state punishment. Whaling holds that for penal measures to
count as “punishment” and attract constitutional protection like nonretroactivity, they must concern nothing other than the time spent in
physical custody. This explains part of Khela too, in terms of the reasons
that the Court sustains access to habeas corpus review in provincial
superior courts. Just as an automatic extension of “in-prison” time is
regarded as punishment attracting constitutional scrutiny, other
deprivations of residual liberty attract writs intended to protect section 7
interests. But here we arrive at the potential mischief caused by this pair
of cases. Reasonableness review under Khela opens the door to
submissive judicial deference when prisoner interests are dealt with
administratively. And, as I said about Whaling, Parliament will have no
trouble crafting laws that make a wide range of deprivations happen
through administrative discretion.
In these two easy prisoner victories, the Court has set rules of the
game that allow significant features of imprisonment to be shaped by the
workings of our institutions of punishment, rather than set out in advance
and controlled by law. Even where Charter rights are clearly engaged,
the Court invites prison officials to make decisions according to their
own priorities and preferences, ensuring that the meaning of state
punishment will be determined by many factors beyond the law.

